This study develops a theoretical framework for pharmaceutical licensing that distinguishes incremental from novel innovations, linking information precision to market outcomes. Using a product-level dataset and Double Machine Learning (DML) with a causal DML-IV instrument (Phase III failures), the authors show that licensing raises predicted success probabilities overall, but the impact on returns varies by innovation regime: incremental projects exhibit return equalization (higher licensing success with lower post-licensing returns), while novel frontier projects often lack this offset, implying lemons-type frictions. The empirical results are decomposed across risk profiles, illustrating that competitive equilibrium holds for incremental projects but is weaker at the innovation frontier, where information frictions persist. The paper concludes with policy implications on transparency and contract design to better price frontier innovations [page::0][page::1]
This paper investigates how bounded attention distorts the estimation of the elasticity of substitution in a CES demand system. In a sparse-max (bounded attention) framework, equilibrium prices and expenditure shares are observationally equivalent to those generated by a fully rational market, but the elasticity identified from data equals the structural elasticity scaled by the attention weight. The standard covariance-based estimator (Feenstra, refined by Broda–Weinstein and Soderbery) identifies the attenuated elasticity, not the true elasticity, because the orthogonality condition on the supply side holds only at the attenuated value. Consequently, without external information, the estimator converges to the attenuated elasticity, implying a fundamental identification failure that is not resolved by larger samples or stronger instruments. Since attention cannot exceed one, the estimated elasticity yields a bona fide lower bound on the true elasticity. The paper derives these results in closed form for a representative consumer, validates them in simulated markets, and discusses policy instruments (e.g., salience-enhancing regulations) as potential sources to separate elasticity from attention [page::5][page::10][page::11][page::15].