Do people expect different behavior from large language models acting on their behalf? Evidence from norm elicitations in two canonical economic games
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摘要
This preregistered paper uses incentivized Krupka–Weber norm elicitations in two canonical games (Dictator and Ultimatum) on representative UK and US samples (total N=2,658) to test whether people apply different social-norm expectations to humans vs. LLMs acting on their behalf. Results show: (1) the modal norm (50/50 split) remains unchanged, (2) offers made by LLMs (when no acceptance is available) are judged overall as less socially appropriate than identical offers by humans, particularly for self-favoring (low) splits, and (3) LLMs serving as enforcers (Responders) are not judged less legitimate for rejecting unfair offers — but people judge rejecting very generous offers from LLM-Proposers as more appropriate than identical offers from human Proposers [page::1][page::24].
