A game of information
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摘要
A game of information introduces two players A and B who reveal noisy information about a binary X; the receiver updates with Bayes rule, and the joint signal-to-noise combinations produce an effective information rate. The main result shows that the problem reduces to a simple infinite game on the unit square, admitting Nash equilibrium with pure strategies for ρ<0 or small positive ρ, and a unique mixed equilibrium when 1/√2 ≤ ρ < 1, with the strategies depending on ρ and the prior p. Introducing disinformation via a drift µ breaks symmetry and yields more intricate equilibria, including mixed strategies under specific conditions. The paper further generalises to three-player settings and time-dependent strategies, highlighting wide applications and open challenges. [page::2][page::3][page::4][page::5]
